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GOVERNANCE AND LEVERAGED 
CORPORATE CONTROL 
Yu-Hsin Lin∗ 
The “one-share one-vote principle,” which states that a 
shareholder’s voting power is proportionate to his or her 
economic right, is one of the most fundamental rules in 
modern corporate law. However, in reality, controlling 
shareholders often obtain voting rights in excess of their 
economic rights through control-enhancing mechanisms, 
allowing them to leverage control over the firm. Empirical 
studies indicate that leveraged corporate control is prevalent 
among listed companies of various countries, yet, to date, 
many countries still disagree on a regulatory framework. The 
EU and OECD conducted studies concerning the regulatory 
policy over control-enhancing mechanisms several years ago. 
However, failing to reach a consensus, the reports only 
advised governments to enhance disclosure and transparency. 
In recent years, entrepreneurs hoping to maintain their 
control after public listing have sought to utilize dual-class 
share structures to leverage corporate control when going 
public. This led to recent reviews by the Hong Kong and 
Singapore stock exchanges—the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
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refused to grant listing with dual-class share structure, while 
the Singapore Stock Exchange approved the proposal to allow 
listing companies to have dual-class shares in order to 
maintain competitiveness. This recent development further 
exemplifies the complexities involved in regulating leveraged 
corporate control and the need to address relevant corporate 
governance concerns. 
This Article reviews the inadequacy of past theoretical and 
empirical research on leveraged corporate control, and re-
examines the issue of corporate governance from the 
contractarian view of corporate law. The Article differentiates 
between the IPO and post-IPO (or midstream) stages and 
argues that the contracting mechanism does not work well in 
the midstream stage. Controlling-minority shareholders 
usually set out various pro-insider provisions in IPO charters, 
which deters minority shareholders from repealing inefficient 
provisions or adopting other value-increasing provisions in 
the midstream. Furthermore, through an analysis Google and 
Facebook’s midstream issuance of non-voting Class C shares 
and the recent going-private transactions of U.S.-listed 
Chinese firms, this Article illustrates the opportunistic 
behaviors of leveraged corporate controllers through 
midstream charter amendments. Finally, this Article 
discusses potential governance strategies against pro-insider 
midstream distortions. Adhering to the “one-share one-vote” 
principle and prohibiting dual-class share structure would 
hinder the flexibility of corporate financing and affect 
economic development. This Article therefore argues against 
outright prohibition of control-enhancing mechanisms and 
advocates returning the governance decision to the hands of 
shareholders by empowering shareholders. In particular, the 
participation of institutional investors and shareholder 
activists is essential to counteract the superpower of 
controlling-minority shareholders and to govern their 
midstream opportunistic behaviors. 
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“In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a 
corporate structure that will make it harder for outside 
parties to take over or influence Google. This structure will 
also make it easier for our management team to follow the 
long term, innovative approach emphasized earlier.” 
  ― Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Founders of Google 
(2004)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One-share one-vote is the key principle behind the 
allocation of corporate ownership and control.2 In keeping 
with this principle, shareholders who contribute more equity 
to a firm exert more control through their voting power. With 
proportionate equity ownership and control, this governance 
structure should provide shareholders with the proper 
incentive to make appropriate decisions and properly 
monitor the firm through voting.3 In reality, a large number 
of public firms around the world do not adhere to the one-
share one-vote rule. Instead, controllers usually leverage 
their control through various control-enhancing mechanisms, 
such as dual-class shares, pyramidal ownership, or cross-
shareholding. These structures are coined as “controlling-
minority structures” to reflect the fact that even though 
controlling shareholders own a minority of the shares, they 
are able to maintain control through the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms.4 This Article also uses “leveraged 
control” to refer to this type of corporate control.5 Proponents 
 
1 Google Inc., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 29 (Aug. 18, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504143377/d4
24b4.htm. 
2 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 67–70 (1991). 
3 Id. 
4 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and 
Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating 
Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 
295, 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
5 Professor   Ronald   Gilson   specifically   uses   the  term   “leveraged 
control” to refer to such type of corporate control. Ronald J. Gilson, The 
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of leveraged control argue that the deviation from one-share 
one-vote should be allowed because shareholders have the 
freedom to contract with respect to the allocation of corporate 
control. However, such deviation from the one-share one-vote 
rule may exacerbate the principal-agent problem in a 
controlled firm because a controlling-minority shareholder is 
not only entrenched, but also has the incentive to extract 
private benefits of control because the controlling-minority 
shareholder owns disproportionally less equity.6 On the other 
hand, a leveraged control firm still enjoys the benefits of 
efficient monitoring by the controlling shareholder. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether a leveraged control structure 
generates net benefits or net costs to shareholders. 
Despite the theoretical controversies, firms with 
controlling-minority structures are widespread: 44% of 
European public companies have at least one type of control-
enhancing mechanism, while 38.7% of East Asian public 
companies use a pyramidal ownership structure to enhance 
corporate control.7 Even in the U.S., where the percentage of 
leveraged control firms has traditionally been low, there is a 
growing number of newly-listed firms adopting dual-class 
shares: 8  28% of firms that underwent an initial public 
offering (“IPO”) between 2011 and 2013 in the U.S. have a 
dual-class  share  structure.9  Google,  Facebook,  Groupon, 
LinkedIn, Zynga, and Alibaba are well-known examples of 
leveraged control firms. 10  Further research is needed to 
 
Nordic Model in an International Perspective: The Role of Ownership, in 
THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 94, 98, 102 (Per Lekvall ed., 
2014). 
6 Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 301–06. 
7 ISS   ET   AL.,   REPORT  ON   THE   PROPORTIONALITY   PRINCIPLE  IN  THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 24 (2007); Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 
92–93 (2000). 
8 Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-
Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1057 (2010). 
9 Richard   J.   Sandler   &   Joseph   A.   Hall,   Corporate  Governance 
Practices in IPOs, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, July/Aug. 2014, at 17, 18.  
10 Paul  Hodgson,  Alibaba  IPO:  Shareholders  Can  Buy  Shares, Not 
Influence, FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/18/alibaba-
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understand the dynamics that shape the proper use of 
control-enhancing mechanisms and the role of law and 
governance in mitigating the distortions in a leveraged 
control structure.11 
This Article first reviews the practice and regulatory 
framework of leveraged control in the United States, Europe, 
and East Asia. In general, most jurisdictions allow for a 
certain amount of deviation from the one-share one-vote rule. 
Yet, there does not seem to be a consensus on how to 
regulate different forms of deviation devices. This Article 
then reviews current theories and empirical studies on 
leveraged control to see if there are coherent grounds either 
for or against leveraged control. As mentioned, the theories 
do not seem to point in a clear direction. Even though the 
findings of the existing empirical studies are mixed, there 
are more studies that suggest leveraged control correlates 
with lower firm value. In particular, there is evidence 
showing that the value discount may not come from 
inefficient monitoring, but rather from the extraction of 
private benefits by controlling-minority shareholders. This 
result explains the concern over increased entrenchment 
agency costs in a leveraged control firm. 
Next, this Article critically reviews the freedom of 
contract argument, which supports practices that deviate 
from the one-share one-vote principle. Through the lens of 
the contractarian theory of the firm, this Article suggests 
that differentiating the IPO stage from the post-IPO (or 
“midstream”) stage is essential in analyzing the agency 
problem faced by outside shareholders in a leveraged control 
firm. This Article argues that the contracting mechanism, 
which ensures the efficiency of any governance design, can be 
 
ipo-shareholders/ [https://perma.cc/GR2R-N4XC]; Nell Minow, The Hidden 
Danger of IPOs Like Groupon and LinkedIn—and What It Will Cost, CBS 
MONEYWATCH (June 10, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-hidden-
danger-of-ipos-like-groupon-and-linkedin-and-what-it-will-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VBK-P3WU]. 
11 Sara  Saggese et al., Evolution of the  Debate on Control  Enhancing 
Mechanisms: A Systematic Review and Bibliometric Analysis, 18 INT. J. 
MGM’T REVS. 417, 434–35 (2016). 
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achieved, at best, only in the IPO stage where potential 
investors can place discounts on any pro-insider governance 
measure and corporate insiders directly suffer the loss of a 
price discount. In the midstream stage, the contracting 
mechanism that is present at the IPO stage is no longer 
present. Therefore, pro-insider charter amendments are 
likely to be passed because outside shareholders lose their 
bargaining power by giving up a majority of the votes to 
controlling-minority shareholders. In the case where a 
leveraged control firm adopted a supermajority voting 
requirement for charter amendments during its IPO, like in 
the case of Google and Alibaba, such a supermajority 
provision further distorts the contracting mechanism in the 
midstream and weakens minority shareholders’ ability to 
adopt value-enhancing amendments. With disproportionate 
voting power at hand, controlling-minority shareholders can 
easily block such amendment proposals. Recent 
recapitalizations of Google and Facebook, as well as going-
private transactions among many U.S.-listed Chinese firms, 
provide vivid examples of the midstream opportunistic 
behaviors of controlling-minority shareholders. 
In the final part, this Article discusses the ways in which 
policy should address the midstream pro-insider distortions 
in leveraged control firms. One size does not fit all. 
Considering how different corporations demonstrate 
different characteristics, this Article argues that an outright 
prohibition of certain types of control-enhancing mechanisms 
may not be optimal. Instead, we should leave these decisions 
in the hands of shareholders. To do so, empowering 
shareholders by increasing shareholder participation would 
be the best way to resolve the imbalance of power in a 
leveraged control firm. In particular, institutional investors, 
together with shareholder activists, could fix the collective 
action problem of outside shareholders and draw attention to 
governance failures in leveraged control firms. 
Part II reviews the current practice and regulatory 
framework of leveraged control in major jurisdictions. Part 
III considers different theories and empirical studies of 
leveraged control and deviation devices. Drawing on the 
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contractarian theory of the firm, Part IV differentiates the 
IPO stage from the midstream stage and identifies 
midstream pro-insider distortions. Part V discusses 
regulatory strategies in governing such distortions. Part VI 
concludes the Article. 
II. OVERVIEW 
A. The Practice 
The most commonly observed structures that create 
deviations between control rights and economic rights 
include multiple voting rights shares, priority shares, 
pyramidal structures, cross-shareholdings, and shareholders’ 
agreements.12  In  a  2007  survey  (“EU   Proportionality 
Report”) of 464 public companies in sixteen European Union 
member states, 44% of the surveyed companies had at least 
one control-enhancing mechanism. 13  Pyramidal structure, 
multiple voting rights shares, and shareholders’ agreements 
are the most common mechanisms used among European 
public companies to create leveraged control.14 In contrast, 
 
12 Multiple voting rights shares, or in its most commonly seen form 
“dual class shares,” are voting structures where two share classes are 
issued and one class carries a greater number of votes per share or 
exclusive director election rights. Pyramid structures are defined as 
owning a majority of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a 
majority of the stock of another corporation, a process that can be repeated 
a number of times. Through pyramid structures, controlling shareholders 
can control firms through a chain of companies while owning only a 
minority of the shares. Cross-shareholding means that a firm owns shares 
in another firm that belongs to the same business group. Finally, 
shareholder voting agreements are agreements among certain 
shareholders to vote in favor of the director candidates or other corporate 
affairs proposed by certain shareholders. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 498–505 (1999); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, 
The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. Fin. 
Econ. 365, 366 (2002); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. 
Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian 
Corporations, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 81, 93 (2000). 
13 ISS ET AL., supra note 7, at 24. 
14 Id. at 25. 
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companies in Western Europe, like Sweden, Switzerland, 
Italy, and Finland mostly use dual-class shares to secure 
disproportionate  corporate  control.15  Other  mechanisms, 
such as pyramids and cross-shareholding, are less common 
in Western Europe. On the other hand, corporate control in 
East Asian countries is typically enhanced by pyramidal 
structures and cross-shareholdings among firms.16 Dual-class 
shares are not common in East Asian countries because they 
are banned in some jurisdictions in conformance with the 
one-share one-vote principle.17 Pyramidal ownership is the 
most common form of leveraged control among public 
companies in Indonesia (66.9%), Singapore (55%), Taiwan 
(49%), and Korea (42.6%); on average, 38.7% of East Asian 
public companies use pyramids to maintain corporate 
control.18 
In the United States, ownership of public companies is 
mostly dispersed. Only approximately 7% of S&P Composite 
1500 companies are controlled firms.19 Pyramids and cross-
shareholding are not common and most U.S. public 
 
15 66.07%, 51.17%, 41.35%, and 37.6% of public companies in Sweden, 
Switzerland, Italy, and Finland respectively issue dual-class shares. Mara 
Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European 
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 385-87 (2002).  
16 Claessens et al., supra note 7, at 82. 
17 Hong Kong, China, South Korea, and Taiwan all follow the one-
share one-vote principle and prohibit dual-class share structure. Japan did 
not have any listed companies with dual-class share structure until 2014. 
See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., CONCEPT PAPER: WEIGHTED 
VOTING RIGHTS 25 (2014), http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/ 
newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082.pdf [https://perma.cc/84GT-
B6EZ]; Hwa-Jin Kim, Concentrated Ownership and Corporate Control: 
Wallenberg Sphere and Samsung Group, 14 J. KOREAN L. 39, 50 (2014); 
Koji Toshima, Letter: Dual-Class Share Structure is Permitted in Japan, 
FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/5f0f2d44-19cf-11e5-
a130-2e7db721f996. 
18 Claessens et al., supra note 7, at 92–93. 
19 In 20 12, 114 companies in the S&P 1500 Composite were controlled 
firms. IRRC INSTITUTE & ISS, CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & 
POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW 3 (2012), 
http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Controlled-
Company-ISS-Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYQ-9Q87]. 
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companies do not belong to a business group.20 The most 
popular mechanism that U.S. public companies tend to use to 
create leveraged control is dual-class shares. A study on U.S. 
public firms reveals that 70% of the controlled firms feature 
a dual-class voting structure or attach special rights to 
specific shareholders.21 A comprehensive study of U.S. public 
companies carried out by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick shows 
that around 6% have dual- or multi-class shares, comprising 
approximately 8% of the market capitalization of all firms.22 
Although the initial number was not large, it has increased 
in recent years along with the growing number of U.S. 
technology firms going public with dual-class share 
structures. The percentage of new IPO firms adopting dual-
class shares in the U.S. rose from 8% in 2008 to 28% in 
2013.23 
B. Regulatory Framework 
Over the past century, both at the national and regional 
levels, there have been several fruitful policy debates over 
how and whether to regulate mechanisms that create 
deviations between ownership and control. 24  Due to the 
 
20 Eugene Kandel et al., The Great Pyramids of America: A Revised 
History of U.S. Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation 2–7 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ, Research, Working Paper No. 19691, 2013). 
21 As  of  2012,  79  out  of  114  controlled   firms   in   the   S&P   
1500 Composite featured multiclass capital structures with unequal voting 
rights. IRRC INSTITUTE & ISS, supra note 19, at 3. 
22 Gompers et al., supra note 8, at 1053. 
23 Sandler & Hall, supra note 9, at 18. 
24 See generally HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT 
OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO 
TAKEOVER BIDS (2002), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ 
docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/39HQ-
HP52]; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
ON THE PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN CAPITAL AND CONTROL IN LISTED 
COMPANIES (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ 
docs/shareholders/impact_assessment_122007.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMF4-
RPDE]; OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LACK OF 
PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: OVERVIEW AND 
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complexity of the issues involved and the fact that each 
jurisdiction operates within very different corporate and 
regulatory environments, the regulatory responses to such 
mechanisms seem drastically different. The 2007 EU 
Proportionality Report showed that pyramidal structure, 
cross-shareholding, and shareholders’ agreements are 
available in all of the surveyed countries whereas multiple 
voting rights shares are only available in 53% of them.25 The 
regulatory framework varies drastically for other 
mechanisms that restrict or empower certain types of shares 
or  specific  shareholders.26  In  this  section,  the  Article 
highlights three broader global regulatory trends with 
respect to deviation devices: no consolidated view at the 
regional level, divergent regulatory policies towards dual-
class shares, and the promotion of long-term investments 
through time-phased voting. 
1. No Consolidated View at the Regional Level 
The European Commission initiated the most recent 
regional policy debate. According to its 2002 Report of the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related 
to Takeover Bids (the “Winter Group Report”),27 the issue of 
proportionality between equity ownership and control was 
brought up with the idea of exploring the possibility of 
harmonizing European company law. Hence, the 
Commission was considering implementing the one-share 
one-vote rule across Europe. Specifically, the Winter Group 
Report states that: 
[P]roportionality between ultimate economic risk and 
control means that share capital which has an 
 
ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION (2007), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/40038351.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9W4T-QLD8]. 
25 ISS ET AL., supra note 7, at 18–22. 
26 The availability of different mechanisms ranges from 81% to 31% of 
the surveyed countries: Non-Voting Preference Shares (81%), Voting Right 
Ceilings (69%), Priority Shares (56%), Golden Shares (44%), Ownership 
Ceilings (37%), Non-Voting Shares (31%). Id. at 16 fig.3.4. 
27 HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, supra note 24.  
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unlimited right to participate in the profits of the 
company or in the residue on liquidation, and only 
such share capital, should normally carry control 
rights, in proportion to the risk carried. The holders 
of these rights to the residual profits and assets of 
the company are best equipped to decide on the 
affairs of the company as the ultimate effects of their 
decisions will be borne by them.28 
Following this report, the European Commission 
entrusted ISS Europe, the European Corporate Governance 
Institute, and the law firm Shearman & Sterling to conduct a 
thorough study on the issue of proportionality of ownership 
and  control.29  Once  the  EU  Proportionality  Report  was 
published in 2007, the proportionality issue began to be 
discussed not only at the EU level, but also within various 
European  countries.30  Finally,  in  September  2007,  the 
European Corporate Governance Forum published a 
statement declaring that “[o]ur current information on and 
understanding of the application of proportionality in EU 
Member States and the effects of non-proportionality on the 
stated EU policy objectives . . . do not provide a basis for 
mandating proportionality rules across the EU.”31 Since then, 
the EU has been regulating control-enhancing mechanisms 
through enhancing disclosure and transparency.32 
Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (“OECD”) conducted an assessment of the 
issue  of  proportionality  in  2007.33  The  OECD  report 
concludes that regulation imposing a one-share one-vote 
principle may not be effective because there are many 
substitutes to voting restrictions that would create similar 
 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 ISS et al., supra note 7. 
30 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 24, 8–9. 
31 Id. at 49. 
32 Wolf-Georg     Ringe,      Deviations      from       Ownership-Control 
Proportionality—Economic Protectionism Revisited, in COMPANY LAW AND 
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM: NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
212–13 (Ulf Bernitz and Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2010). 
33 OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 24. 
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deviations as a result.34 In addition, mandating one-share 
one-vote may deter companies controlled by entrepreneurs 
from seeking public listing  and  thus  discourage  the 
innovation  and  entrepreneurship  that  are  essential  for 
economic   development.35  In   the   end,   the  OECD 
recommended alternatives, such as strengthening the 
corporate governance framework, to reduce private benefits 
extraction and to target specific problems involving 
proportionality with appropriate regulatory impact 
assessments.36 Ultimately, both the EU and OECD came to 
the same conclusion—rather than impose the one-share one-
vote principle across jurisdictions, the decision should be left 
to local government authorities. 
2. Divergent Regulatory Policies Towards Dual-
Class Shares 
In general, there is consensus on the principle of 
proportionality between equity ownership and control based 
on relatively straightforward economic sense and equal 
treatment among shareholders. At the same time, there 
seems to be consensus that companies should be allowed to 
deviate from this proportionality principle—at least as 
evidenced by the prevalence of pyramidal group structures in 
most countries. 37  Within  this  consensus,  however, lie 
disagreements over which mechanisms should be allowed to 
create such deviations. As the ISS survey shows, the main 
difficulty pertains to the restriction or empowerment of 
certain types of shares, or specific shareholders, in the 
corporate  charter.38  In  particular,  the  dual-class  share 
structure has attracted the most attention in recent years 
because many prominent IPO firms adopted such a 
 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id.  
36 See id. at 4–6.  
37 See ISS ET AL., supra note 7, at 14–15. 
38 See id. at 15–16. 
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structure, and it has provoked debate among stock exchanges 
as to whether to allow multiple voting rights shares.39 
There are three main regulatory policies governing dual-
class share structures.40 The first is the permissive approach, 
which is complemented by substantial disclosure 
requirements, such as those that are seen in the United 
States and Canada.41 The second approach is prohibition and 
mandating one-share one-vote through corporate law. This 
approach applies in countries such as Germany, Spain, and 
China.42 The third is to allow dual-class shares in private 
companies but prohibit public companies from deviating from 
the one-share one-vote principle. Most Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, such as the UK, Hong Kong, and Australia, 
have adopted the third approach.43 
Since 2014, regulators in China, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore have revisited their one-share one-vote policy and 
reconsidered accepting a dual-class share structure. China’s 
largest e-retailer, Alibaba, launched the largest IPO of all 
time in September 2014 on the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”). Alibaba had previously sought to list on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (“HKEx”) with a dual-class share 
structure,44 but it was rebuffed on the grounds that the dual-
class share structure violated the one-share one-vote rule.45 
However, competition among international stock exchanges 
has forced participants in the Hong Kong market to 
reconsider their strict one-share one-vote policy. In August 
2014, HKEx issued a concept paper on weighted voting 
rights and solicited the opinions of market participants.46 In 
June 2015, HKEx concluded, “generally, ‘one share, one vote’ 
 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 43–52. 
40 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 17, at 10. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 See id.  
44 Yu-Hsin  Lin  &  Thomas  Mehaffy,  Open  Sesame:  The  Myth  of 
Alibaba’s Extreme Corporate Governance and Control, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 437, 441–42 (2016). 
45 Id. 
46 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 17. 
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should prevail but that WVR [weighted voting rights] 
structures should be allowed for certain companies in certain 
circumstances and with certain safeguards.”47 However, the 
Securities and Futures Commission rejected HKEx’s 
proposal on the basis that safeguards and conditions might 
not be monitored on an ongoing basis.48 In October 2015, 
HKEx finally decided to abandon its proposal to allow a dual-
class share structure and to continue to strictly uphold the 
one-share one-vote rule for future listings.49 
In contrast to Hong Kong, Singapore has been more 
aggressive in competing for international equity offerings. 
On August 29, 2016, the Singapore Exchange’s Listings 
Advisory Committee approved the proposal to allow listing 
companies to have dual-class shares. 50   Singapore  has 
debated this issue ever since Manchester United considered 
listing there in 2011 but eventually listed in the United 
States under a dual-class share structure.51 Traditionally, 
Singapore has followed the Commonwealth approach, where 
only private companies are allowed to have dual-class 
shares. To pave the way for the change, the Singapore 
Companies Act was amended and took effect in early 2016, 
allowing public companies to have different classes of shares 
that confer different voting rights, including dual-class 
 
47 HONG   KONG     EXCHANGES     &     CLEARING     LTD.,     CONSULTATION 
CONCLUSIONS TO CONCEPT PAPER ON WEIGHTED VOTING RIGHTS 3 (2015). 
48 SFC Statement On The SEHK’s Draft Proposal On Weighted 
Voting Rights, SEC. & FUTURES COMM’N (June 25, 2015), 
https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=15PR69. 
49 Jennifer  Hughes,  Hong  Kong  Puts  Shareholder  Rights  Ahead  
of  Desire for IPOs, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
7b8a1732-6b4a-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html#axzz3nkFPKRNH. 
50 Andrea  Tan,  Joyce  Koh  &  Yoolim  Lee,  Singapore’s   Dual-Class 
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shares.52 Following Hong Kong’s rejection of the dual-class 
share structure, market observers expect Singapore to fill 
the gap and attract more international equity offerings.53 
As for China, the State Council and Shanghai Stock 
Exchange had considered opening the market to foreign-
registered Chinese firms that have a dual-class share 
structure to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation and 
the return of foreign-listed Chinese firms.54 As of May 2014, 
102 Chinese companies listed their shares on U.S. stock 
exchanges; among them, almost one-third (30 out of 102) had 
dual-class share structures.55 This third represents 70% of 
the market capitalization of all U.S.-listed Chinese firms.56 
However, this proposal has not been put into practice so far. 
That being said, the policy debate over the relaxation of the 
one-share one-vote principle in China is still ongoing. 
Whether due to the purpose of encouraging long-term focus 
in public companies or of providing more equity financing 
options to start-up companies, the trend towards more 
diverse corporate control design is inevitable.57 
 
52 Companies  (Amendment)   Act   2014,  §  64A   (No.   36   of   2014); 
Jacqueline Woo, Dual-Class Shares Could Help Boost Local Market,  




54 THE STATE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OPINIONS OF 
THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON CONSTRUCTING MASS 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION (guo wu yuan guan yu da li tui jin da 
zhong chuang ye wan zhong chuang xin ruo gan zheng ce cuo shi de yi 
jian),  GUOFA [2015] NO. 32 (2015) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
06/16/content_9855.htm [https://perma.cc/2TTT-DUJB];WU XINCHUN & 
XING MEI, ALLOWING DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES TO ADAPT TO NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE (cheng ren shuang ceng gu quan jie gou 
shi ying xin xing gong si zhi li shi jian) (Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Research Report Series 2015 No. 50, 2015), 
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/research/research/c/3986627.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UHB3-P5K9]. 
55 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 47, at 41. 
56 Id. 
57 Zhu Ciyun and Shen Zhaohui, Classified Shares and the Evolution 
of Chinese Corporate Law, 9 SOC. SCI. CHINA 147, 158–62 (2013); Special 
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3. Promoting Long-Term Investments through 
Time-Phased Voting 
Recently, within European countries there has also been 
a trend towards granting multiple voting rights to encourage 
long-term investment. France passed the Florange Act in 
March 2014, which amends Article L.225-123 of the French 
Commercial Code, making it a default rule that shareholders 
who hold shares for more than two years will be granted 
double voting rights unless two-thirds of shareholders agree 
to opt out.58 The new law rewards loyalty shares with double 
voting rights to encourage long-term investments. Before the 
Act took effect, 57% of French SBF-120 companies had time-
phased voting, suggesting that deviations from one-share 
one-vote were common in France even before the adoption of 
the  Florange  Act.59  After  making  time-phased  voting  a 
default rule, the adoption rate among French SBF-120 
companies rose by 12%.60 By June 30, 2015, 41 French SBF-
120 companies had proposed to opt-out of the Florange Act 
and 34 had passed. 61  Opt-out proposals were strongly 
supported by shareholders; 75% of the firms passed the opt-
out proposal with over 90% shareholder support. 62  Italy 
 
Reporting Grp. of Shanghai Sec. Journal for the Two Sessions, Wu 
Xiaoling Comments on Baoneng-Vanke Hostile Takeover: Consider 
Introducing Dual-class Shares and Anti-takeover Measures (wu xiao ling 
ping bao wan zhi zheng jiao xun: ke yan jiu AB gu zhi du fan shou gou tiao 
kuan) (Mar. 9, 2017), CNSTOCK.COM, http://news.cnstock.com/event,2017lh-
2017lhzb-201703-4046037.htm [https://perma.cc/2BWR-527U].  
58 Loi 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l’économie 
réelle [Law 2014-384 of March 29, 2014 Aimed at Reconquering the Real 
Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 





59 KEVIN DE PRIL ET AL., ISS, EUROPEAN VOTING RESULTS REPORT: 2015 
UPDATE 21 (2015). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 22. 
62 Id. 
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followed France and removed its prohibition on multiple 
voting rights in August 2015 to allow companies to opt-in if 
two-thirds of the shareholders approve.63 However, a further 
revision to lower the threshold to a simple majority was later 
suspended due to fierce opposition from institutional 
investors since most Italian public companies have 
controlling shareholders.64 In 2015, the European Union also 
considered an amendment proposal to the Shareholders’ 
Rights Directive of 2007 to reward long-term shareholders 
with extra voting rights or dividends.65 Even in the United 
States, scholars advocate that companies should use time-
phased voting to address concerns over short-termism.66 
However, time-phased voting also raises the concern over 
protectionism in Europe if used by a state-owned 
enterprise.67 The French government actively supports time-
 
63 Marco   Ventoruzzo,   The  Disappearing  Taboo  of   Multiple Voting 
Shares: Regulatory Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 1 
(European Corporate Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 
288/2015, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574236.  
64 Bram Hendriks, Differential Ownership Rights: A Tool to Stimulate 
Long-Term Share Ownership with Negative Consequences, INVESTMENT 
EUROPE (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.investmenteurope.net/opinion/ 
differential-ownership-rights-a-tool-to-stimulate-long-term-share-
ownership-with-negative-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/9NEU-UV82]; 
Faccio & Lang, supra note 15, at 378–79. 
65 Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the 
Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EU as  Regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance 
Statement, at 10, 33, COM (2014) 0213 (May 12, 2015); Jeroen Delvoie & 
Carl Clottens, Accountability and Short-Termism: Some Notes on Loyalty 
Shares, 9 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 19, 23 (2015). On July 8, 2015, the 
European Parliament rejected the proposal to reward long-term 
shareholders. See Nctm Studio Legale, Revision of the Shareholders Rights 
Directive: It’s a Long Way Home, LEXOLOGY (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=10cdafcd-9dea-43fc-9016-
a96ae6952489 [https://perma.cc/6YEL-YN3M]. 
66 Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and 
Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 546–47 (2015). See generally 
David J. Berger et al., Tenure Voting and the U.S. Public Company, 72 
BUS. LAW. 295 (2017).   
67 Ringe, supra note 32, at 218. 
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phased voting in companies where the government itself is a 
major shareholder.68 For example, the French government 
temporarily increased its stakes in Renault, for which it is a 
major shareholder, during the voting season through share 
borrowing  and  put  and  call options. 69  Critics have 
commented that the French reforms were led by a socialist 
government in order to control state-owned enterprises with 
less capital and as a protectionist guard against foreign 
investors.70 
III. THEORETICAL DEBATE AND EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
As illustrated in the previous section, leveraged corporate 
control is common, but the means utilized by controlling 
shareholders are quite diverse and vary markedly among 
jurisdictions. No consensus on policy has been reached on a 
regional level and different jurisdictions usually have 
different preferences when it comes to the means for 
leveraged control. Different countries may value equality and 
democracy in the corporate setting differently due to 
diversity in their political, societal, cultural, and economic 
conditions. This section reviews existing theories with regard 
to proportionality in corporate control to explore whether 
there are coherent grounds for or against proportionality in 
corporate ownership and control. As demonstrated in this 
section, since there are competing views among scholars 
about the effects of leveraged control, a further review of the 
empirical studies is warranted. 
A. Agency Theory Account 
The agency theory views controlling-minority structures 
from an economic perspective and provides a framework to 
 
68 KEVIN DE PRIL ET AL., ISS, supra note 59, at 22. 
69 Id. 
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empirically examine the effects of leveraged control. In a 
controlled firm, the principal-agency problem arises between 
controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders, as 
opposed to that which exists between managers and 
shareholders in a dispersed ownership firm. There are two 
counteracting effects of concentrated ownership on the 
governance of firms: (1) the entrenchment effect, where 
concentrated ownership protects controlling shareholders 
from potential takeover threats and makes it easier for 
opportunistic controllers to expropriate minority 
shareholders; and (2) the incentive effect, where 
concentrated ownership provides controlling shareholders 
with incentives to monitor management, which makes 
monitoring more efficient.71 As long as the incentive effect is 
greater than the entrenchment effect, non-controlling 
shareholders should benefit from having controlling 
shareholders in a firm.72 In a firm with leveraged control, it 
is not clear from the agency theory whether the benefits of 
the incentive effect would outweigh the costs of the 
entrenchment effect or the other way around. 
Easterbrook and Fischel promoted the one-share one-vote 
principle by arguing that shareholders are the only group of 
corporate stakeholders who have the appropriate incentives 
to make discretionary decisions because they are the ones 
who bear the risks of bad decisions.73  Leveraged control 
would undermine the incentive mechanism arising from 
ownership-control proportionality and result in great risks of 
opportunistic expropriation. Furthermore, a controlling-
minority structure would insulate controllers from potential 
takeovers and protect them from being replaced, even if 
there are inefficiencies.74 As a result, leveraged control firms 
 
71 Randall   Morck   et   al.,   Management    Ownership   and    Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988); Morten 
Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Incentive and Entrenchment Effects 
in European Ownership, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2212, 2212 (2010). 
72 Ronald  J.  Gilson  &  Jeffrey  N.  Gordon,  Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785–86 (2003). 
73 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 67–70. 
74 Id. at 70–74; Ringe, supra note 32, at 217. 
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suffer from increased agency costs, which have an adverse 
effect  on  firm  value.75  The  agency  theory  provides  a 
normative theory on concentrated ownership. Whether a 
leveraged control structure generates net benefits or net 
costs to shareholders may vary depending on the 
characteristics of the companies or the regulatory 
environment of a given jurisdiction. Empirical studies are 
thus useful for a positive account of the net effect of 
leveraged corporate control. 
B. Freedom of Contract Account 
The freedom of contract account is a market-based claim 
that challenges the strict proportionality principle from the 
perspective  of  contractual  freedom.76  Proponents  of  the 
freedom of contract account consider a mandatory one-share 
one-vote rule as interference in shareholder’s sovereignty 
and independence. Shareholders are free to decide a 
company’s internal affairs because they are the ones who 
ultimately bear the risks. Companies should enjoy autonomy 
and regulators should not intervene unless the corporate 
decision causes harm to society as a whole. The freedom of 
contract claim basically advocates contractual freedom 
among shareholders for the governance of internal corporate 
affairs.77 This is the claim that is mostly used by Nordic 
scholars and policy makers to explain the widespread 
adoption of multiple voting rights shares in the region.78 
C. Long-Term Value Account 
The long-term value account argues that by shielding 
companies from the market for corporate control, control-
enhancing mechanisms help incumbents fight short-termism 
 
75 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-
Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1684–86 (2013).  
76 See OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 
24, at 6–7; Ringe, supra note 32, at 219. 
77 Ringe, supra note 32, at 219. 
78 Ulf Bernitz, The Attack on the Nordic Multiple Voting Rights Model: 
The Legal Limits Under EU Law, 15 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (2004). 
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and encourage them to pursue long-term investments, which 
in turn increase long-term shareholder value.79 Recent legal 
scholarship further expands on this argument by focusing on 
entrepreneurial vision. In recent years, many high-tech firms 
have gone public with their entrepreneurs still maintaining 
control through the adoption of dual-class shares or other 
control-enhancing mechanisms. Scholars argue that 
entrepreneurs usually possess idiosyncratic visions for their 
companies that outside shareholders do not have.80 With 
stable control, entrepreneurs will be able to realize their 
idiosyncratic visions by executing the business decisions of 
their choice even though outside investors may not recognize 
the potential value of the decision. If an investment succeeds, 
all the shareholders will share the profits pro rata. Thus, a 
dual-class share structure is likely to benefit the investors if 
the entrepreneurs turn out to be right.81 This is especially 
true with today’s corporations. Unlike the corporations 
during the Industrial Age when most of their value was 
derived from physical assets and manufacturing activities, 
corporations in the information economy create value from 
human capital and intangible assets, such as know-how, 
patents, and research and development projects.82 From the 
perspective of asset pricing theory, information about the 
value of long-term investments is not observable or verifiable 
by outside investors and hence it is less accurately reflected 
in the asset price. In this situation, the market is more likely 
to suffer from short-termism because shareholders are apt to 
misjudge a valuable long-term investment as value-
decreasing because of a short-term increase in capital 
 
79 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
63–73 (2012); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2010); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2006). 
80 Zohar    Goshen    &    Assaf    Hamdani,    Corporate    Control   and 
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 577–579 (2016).   
81 See id. 
82 See Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a 
“Technological Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 99, 100–03 (2010). 
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expenditure.83 In this case, it would be more efficient to 
allocate more power to the entrepreneurs by granting them 
leveraged control through adopting a dual-class share 
structure or other control-enhancing devices. 
D. Empirical Findings 
In the face of opposing theoretical claims and unsettled 
regulatory approaches, existing empirical evidence must be 
analyzed for further guidance. The key question is whether 
control-enhancing mechanisms affect shareholder value. 
Would leveraged control create greater agency costs of 
entrenchment and thus decrease outside shareholders’ value 
(the entrenchment effect)? Or would leveraged control help 
controlling shareholders better monitor the firm and 
maximize its value (the incentive effect)? Under what 
circumstances would the benefits of value creation outweigh 
the costs of entrenchment? 
For shareholder value, it should be noted that the value of 
control-enhancing mechanisms to outside shareholders is 
different from the value to controlling shareholders. For 
example, in a firm with a dual-class share structure, shares 
that carry more votes should be worth more than shares that 
carry only one vote. The extra value that the market awards 
to these multiple vote shares is called the “control premium.” 
However, multiple vote shares are usually not tradable in 
the market. Most prior empirical studies use market price as 
a proxy for shareholder value, which in fact only measures 
the value of shares to outside shareholders.84 Consequently, 
the value of leveraged control to a controlling shareholder is 
very difficult to measure empirically and typically can only 
be assessed in a change-of-control transaction. For the 
purposes of this research, we care more about the impact of 
the control-enhancing mechanism on the share value of 
 
83 Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When 
Some Information Is Soft, 20 REV. FIN. 2151, 2153 (2016); Cremers & Sepe, 
supra note 80, at 81. 
84 Renée   Adams   &   Daniel   Ferreira,  One   Share-One   Vote:   The 
Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 62–63 (2008). 
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outside shareholdings. Therefore, in this section we review 
empirical studies that address this issue. 
Most earlier studies use the wedge between the economic 
rights and the control rights of shareholders to measure the 
level of deviation and examine the impact of such deviation 
on shareholder value without differentiating between the 
types of mechanisms that have caused the wedge. Using 
cross-country data, both La Porta et al. and Claessens et al. 
find that the cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders are 
positively correlated with shareholder value, which is 
consistent with the incentive effect of cash-flow ownership 
under agency theory.85 With regard to the effect of the wedge 
on firm value, the results are somewhat mixed. Most studies 
find the wedge correlates with lower firm value, supporting 
the entrenchment effect hypothesis. Claessens et al.’s study 
of firms in eight East Asian economies found that the wedge 
correlates with lower firm value. However, they did not 
uncover whether any specific type of mechanism, i.e., 
pyramids, cross-shareholding, or dual-class shares, drives 
the value discount.86  Lins found similar evidence on the 
negative impact of the wedge created by disproportionate 
mechanisms on firm value in 1433 sample firms from 18 
emerging economies.87  In contrast, based on a sample of 
large firms in 27 wealthy economies, La Porta et al. did not 
find a significant correlation between the wedge and firm 
value, but they support the notion that country-level investor 
protection increases firm value.88 
Other studies on European countries fail to support the 
incentive effect and find limited evidence on the 
entrenchment effect. Cronqvist and Nilsson analyzed a 
sample of 309 Swedish firms and found that the voting power 
 
85 Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 
57 J. FIN. 1147, 1147–49 (2002); Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the 
Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 
2741, 2758 (2002).  
86 Claessens et al., supra note 86, at 2756–58, 2768.  
87 Karl  V.  Lins,  Equity  Ownership  and  Firm  Value  in  Emerging 
Markets, 38 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANALYSIS 159, 181 (2003). 
88 La Porta et al., supra note 85, at 1162–64, 1163 n.11. 
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of controlling shareholders is negatively correlated with firm 
value. They did not find a significant correlation between 
cash-flow rights and the wedge, but relate family ownership 
to negative firm value.89 Maury and Pajuste studied Finnish 
firms and used the control-to-ownership ratio as a proxy for 
the entrenchment effect. They found a negative impact of 
vote concentration on firm value (which supports the 
entrenchment effect), but they did not find evidence for the 
incentive effect of cash-flow ownership.90 
Apart from large-scale cross-country analyses, studies on 
U.S. public firms mainly focus on one mechanism—dual-class 
shares.91 The seminal paper written by Gompers et al. tried 
to disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects by 
examining U.S. public firms with dual-class share 
structures.92 They found that firm value increases alongside 
an increase in insider cash flow rights and decreases with 
the increase in insider voting rights. They also found firm 
value to be negatively correlated with the wedge between 
cash flow rights and voting rights, suggesting a negative 
impact of the dual-class share structure on shareholder 
value.93 Since control-enhancing mechanisms are chosen by 
the firm, they are inherently endogenous. Hence, these 
studies are subject to the endogeneity problem and require a 
cautious interpretation of their results. 94  Gompers et al. 
attempted to address the endogeneity problem by using 
seven instrumental variables.95 However, the quality of the 
instruments has been contested by scholars and additional 
 
89 Henrik Cronqvist & Mattias Nilsson, Agency Costs of Controlling 
Minority Shareholders, 38 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANALYSIS 695, 697 (2003). 
90 Benjamin Maury & Anete Pajuste, Multiple Large Shareholders 
and Firm Value, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1813, 1827 (2005). 
91 Large firms in the United States are free-standing and widely held. 
Pyramidal ownership is virtually non-existent due to the introduction of 
the intercorporate dividend tax in 1935. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 
Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 164 
(2005). 
92 Gompers et al., supra note 8, at 1054.   
93 Id. at 1073–76.   
94 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 84, at 67–68. 
95 Gompers et al., supra note 8, at 1071–72. 
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research needs to be undertaken to address the endogeneity 
issue.96 In summary, there is empirical evidence supporting 
the correlation between control-enhancing mechanisms and 
lower firm value, but a causal link between the two has yet 
to be established.97 If our policy goal is to protect outside 
shareholders, it is then justified to implement policies that 
would align the proportionality between control and 
ownership. However, do we know which mechanism creates 
the most agency costs to outside shareholders? 
Most studies focus on the degree of deviation from 
proportionality, whereas very few discuss whether the 
mechanisms used also matter. Bennedsen and Nielsen 
addressed this issue by studying a large sample of European 
firms. Consistent with prior research, they found large and 
significant value discounts on firms with leveraged control in 
Europe.98 In particular, the value discount on firms with 
dual-class shares was more than twice as large as the 
discounts on firms with pyramidal structures, while cross-
shareholding and other mechanisms did not have a 
significant impact on firm value.99 When comparing firms 
with different control-enhancing mechanisms, they found 
that the larger value discount in dual-class share firms may 
be attributed to worse operating performance, smaller 
dividend payout, and lower growth in assets relative to 
pyramidal firms.100 Since family firms are overrepresented 
among firms with a controlling-minority structure, it is not 
clear whether the lower value discount is driven by their 
over-representation among dual-class firms.101 
Villalonga and Amit studied whether different forms of 
control-enhancing mechanisms matter in U.S. firms by 
examining the individual effects of dual-class shares, voting 
agreements, pyramids, and disproportional board 
 
96 Bennedsen & Nielsen, supra note 71, at 2213; Adams & Ferreira, 
supra note 84, at 64–65. 
97 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 84, at 64–65. 
98 Bennedsen & Nielsen, supra note 71, at 2216–17. 
99 Id. at 2217, 2220. 
100 Id. at 2221–23. 
101 Id. at 2222. 
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representation. They found that dual-class shares and 
disproportional board representation have a negative impact, 
though not statistically significant, while pyramids and 
voting agreements have a positive impact on the market 
value of a firm.102 Based on the research presented thus far, 
the difference in the value discount between dual-class firms 
and pyramidal firms—which is both economically and 
statistically significant—implies that future policymakers 
and researchers need to pay more attention to the impact of 
different  forms  of  control-enhancing  mechanisms. 103 
However, it should also be noted that, similar to other 
ownership studies, these studies encounter the problem that 
firms do not randomly choose their ownership structure and 
it is very hard to dissect the pure effects of adopting control-
enhancing mechanisms. 
With regard to the channels through which the wedge 
leads to lower shareholder values, empirical studies have 
shown that the operating performance of leveraged control 
firms is not significantly different than that of regular firms, 
yet the market values of leveraged control firms are 
significantly lower than those of regular firms. The result 
indicates that controlling shareholders efficiently monitor 
firm operations but extract disproportional surplus after the 
operations have been carried out.104 Masulis et al. found 
evidence that supports the notion that managers in U.S. 
dual-class firms extract private benefits at the expense of 
outside shareholders. They found that as the gap between 
voting rights and cash flow rights widen, cash reserves are 
worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher 
compensation, managers make shareholder value-destroying 
acquisitions that benefit themselves more often, and capital 
expenditures contribute less to shareholder value.105 
 
102 Belén Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Are U.S. Family Firms 
Controlled?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3047, 3082–88 (2009). 
103 Bennedsen & Nielsen, supra note 71, at 2227. 
104 Id. at 2222. 
105 Ronald   W.   Masulis   et   al.,   Agency   Problems   at   Dual-Class 
Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1697 (2009). 
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Despite the fact that there are certain variations in the 
empirical results, most of the research studies that we 
surveyed suggest that controlling-minority structure 
correlates with lower firm value. That means that there is a 
value discount on firms with leveraged corporate control. The 
evidence, though limited, tends to show that the value 
discount does not come from the inefficient monitoring of 
controllers, but rather, it comes from the extraction of 
private benefits of control by controllers. From an outside 
shareholder’s perspective, the cost of extraction is higher 
than the benefits of efficient monitoring. Furthermore, the 
mechanism that is used to create leveraged corporate control 
matters; dual-class share structures seem to receive a higher 
discount than pyramidal structures, yet we do not know 
much about the factors contributing to the creation of such 
difference. 
IV. A CONTRACTARIAN VIEW OF THE CURRENT 
REGIME 
The most common challenge associated with a strict 
proportionality principle is the contractual freedom of 
shareholders.106 The contractarian theory of the firm views 
the corporation as a nexus of contracts between stakeholders, 
including shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, and 
others.107 The  most  important  contractual  right  that 
shareholders have is to vote on corporate matters. 
Shareholders should be free to decide on the allocation of 
corporate control, including limiting or giving up their voting 
rights and control. In an efficient market, we shall see 
different allocations of corporate control in different firms, 
thus reflecting the preferences of shareholders and the 
characteristics of individual firms. The contractual 
 
106 To narrow the scope of discussion, this Article only focuses on the 
deviations stipulated in the corporate charters that are directly related to 
the contractual freedom claim, such as dual-class shares, priority shares, 
or non-voting shares. 
107 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976). 
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mechanism is achieved through pricing. If the shareholders 
perceive high entrenchment costs arising from the 
controlling-minority structure, shareholders would place a 
discount on the share price and the insiders would be 
penalized by such a discount directly in the IPO.108 However, 
markets are not perfect. The existing literature has 
identified externalities in the IPO contracting process and 
has found empirical evidence that counteracts the notion 
that IPO governance design is optimal.109 Furthermore, prior 
literature has also identified inefficiencies in corporate 
contracting in the post-IPO stage in a widely-held firm and 
called for limits to contractual freedom post-IPO. 110  This 
Article draws on existing contractarian literature and 
applies it to the controlling-minority corporate structure with 
the aim of reconsidering the freedom of contract account and 
identifying externalities in the post-IPO contracting process. 
Importantly, this Article uncovers serious pro-insider 
distortions in the post-IPO stage through examples taken 
from leveraged control firms and calls for changes to protect 
the interests of outside shareholders. 
A. Is the IPO Governance Design Optimal? 
The agency relation between managers and shareholders 
in a dispersed-ownership firm, or that between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders in a concentrated-
ownership firm, is at the heart of modern corporate 
governance theory.111 The aim of corporate governance rules 
 
108 See   Lucian   A.   Bebchuk,   Limiting   Contractual   Freedom   in 
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1828–29 (1989). 
109 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks 
of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 759 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 
“the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 717 (1997); John C. 
Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 
89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1385 (2001). For empirical studies, see infra note 
121.  
110 See Bebchuk, supra note 108, at 1827–29.  
111 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 107, at 308–10. 
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is to minimize agency costs and maximize shareholder 
value.112   The  contractarian  view  of  corporate  law 
characterizes a corporate charter as a contract between the 
firm, its controllers (managers or controlling shareholders), 
and outside shareholders. The contractual agreement is 
formed through pricing.113 The price of a stock reflects the 
quality of the corporate governance rules and the extent to 
which these rules reduce agency costs and maximize firm 
value.114 
This theory predicts that when firms go public, they will 
adopt a set of optimal governance rules in their IPO charters 
in order to be competitive in obtaining external finance. Pre-
IPO shareholders would bear the cost of any price discount if 
outside investors were to price the shares lower for bad 
corporate governance design.115  Therefore, provisions that 
would decrease shareholder value are not expected to be 
included in IPO charters. 116  The contractarian theory 
provides a powerful normative claim for what IPO charters 
should look like. Similar to other theoretical claims, 
contractarian theory is based on the assumption of a perfect 
market in which there are no transaction costs or other 
market imperfections. Even if there were, they would only be 
the drafting costs for corporate charters, which should be 
modest.117 In reality, market imperfections are more complex 
and prevalent than the contractarian theory posits.118 
Scholars have identified the network externalities of 
corporate contracting as one of the impediments to the 
optimal IPO charter predicted by the contractarian 
 
112 Id. at 309–10. 
113 EASTERBROOK   &   FISCHEL,   supra   note  2,    at   15–22;   Michael 
Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1325, 1332 (2013). 
114 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 17–19. 
115 Id. at 17–19. 
116 Id. at 204–05; Klausner, supra note 113, at 1332–33. 
117 Klausner, supra note 113, at 1330. 
118 Id.  at  1330;  Michael  Klausner,  The  Contractarian  Theory  of 
Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779 (2006). 
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theorists.119  In  practice,  firms  adopt  boilerplate  charter 
provisions to avoid the legal uncertainty of adopting 
innovative and customized provisions that are best suited to 
their firms.120 Empirical studies also provide evidence that 
firms do not always adopt value-enhancing provisions in 
their IPO charters. Instead, IPO charters commonly include 
a staggered board, which is a takeover defense that is 
considered to be value-decreasing.121 
From an agency theory perspective, one-share one-vote is 
an efficient allocation of corporate control because 
shareholders are the only group of corporate stakeholders 
who bear the risks of bad decisions and have the right 
incentives to make discretionary decisions.122 Mechanisms 
that create deviations from the one-share one-vote rule 
would result in greater entrenchment agency costs by 
insulating managers from the market for corporate 
control.123 Controlling-minority shareholders not only have 
the incentive, but also the ability, to extract private benefits 
at  the  expense  of  outside  shareholders.124  From  a 
contractarian theorist’s point of view, mechanisms that offer 
shareholders leveraged control are not desirable in IPO 
charters. 
However, as mentioned earlier, leveraged control 
mechanisms among European and East Asian firms are 
 
119 Klausner, supra note 109, at 785–86. 
120 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 109, at 718–24. 
121 Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize 
Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 110 
(2001); Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of 
IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857, 1858 (2002); William C. Johnson et al., The 
Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. 
FIN. ECON. 307, 308 (2015). 
122 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 67–70. 
123 Id. at 71; see Bebchuk, supra note 75, 1679–81; c.f. Rolf Skog, The 
European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the “Breakthrough” Rule 
and the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock, 45 SCANDINAVIAN 
STUD. L. 293, 302–04 (2003). 
124 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4.  
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widespread.125 Even in the United States, where historically 
only around 6% of firms have employed a multi-class share 
structure, leveraged control mechanisms have gained more 
traction in recent decades.126 In their IPO charters, large 
tech firms that went public since Google’s IPO in 2004 have 
commonly adopted dual-class shares or other leveraged 
control mechanisms that grant multiple voting rights or 
other priority rights to their founders.127 Google, Facebook, 
Groupon, LinkedIn, Zynga, and Alibaba are some well-
known examples.128 A recent survey by Davis Polk on U.S. 
IPOs between September 1, 2011 and October 31, 2013 
reports that 28% of the newly listed non-controlled firms 
employ dual or multi-class common stock.129 As compared to 
8% in 2008 and 18% in 2011, we see a steady growth in 
adopting leveraged control mechanisms in the U.S. IPO 
market.130  Since these firms are the driving force of the 
economy and their market capitalizations are huge, we 
should not overlook the impact of their corporate governance 
practices on investor protection and capital market 
development. 
In sum, the contractarian view of corporate law suggests 
that IPO charters are optimal, yet in practice these charters 
commonly include leveraged control or other entrenchment 
provisions. Scholars have tried to examine whether there are 
efficiency reasons for firms to adopt entrenchment provisions 
at the IPO stage, such as ensuring stronger bargaining 
 
125 See ISS ET AL., supra note 7; Faccio & Lang, supra note 15; 
Claessens et al., supra note 7. 
126 See Gompers et al., supra note 8, at 1052; IRRC INSTITUTE & ISS, 
supra note 19. 
127 James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares 
[https://perma.cc/9YWU-2QW9]. 
128 See Hodgson, supra note 10. 
129 See Sandler & Hall, supra note 9, at 18 tbl.1. The definition of 
“controlled companies” is in accordance with the NYSE listing rule which 
provides that “[a] listed company of which more than 50% of the voting 
power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group or 
another company”. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.00. 
130 Sandler & Hall, supra note 9, at 18 tbl.1. 
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power in the event of a hostile bid. However, they not only 
find no supporting evidence, but they actually find evidence 
supporting the notion that IPO managers deploy 
antitakeover measures to pursue private benefits of 
control.131 Further evidence from the United States suggests 
that lawyers are the primary influence in firms adopting a 
staggered board, an entrenchment provision in IPO 
charters.132 Anecdotal reports from practitioners also imply 
that entrenched governance provisions do not affect IPO 
pricing.133 What investors care more about in the IPO stage 
is the business’ value itself, not so much corporate 
governance issues. From the empirical evidence that we have 
so far, it seems that practitioners do not factor in governance 
rules in IPO pricing as hypothesized by the contractarian 
theory. This casts further doubt on the contractarians’ belief 
that IPO charters are optimal. 
B. Pro-Insider Distortions in the Midstream Stage 
Even if we consider the initial charter to be optimal and 
that governance rules are fully integrated into the IPO 
pricing where entrepreneurs fully internalize the costs of 
suboptimal governance mechanisms, the contracting 
mechanism posited by contractarians does not seem to work 
that well after the initial offering—a stage that is known as 
the “midstream” stage.134 A corporation is a separate legal 
entity from its founders and has a distinct legal personality 
that lasts in perpetuity, wholly independent of its 
founders.135 To succeed and stay profitable in a competitive 
market, companies need to have the ability to adapt to the 
ever-changing  business  environment.136  Even  corporate 
 
131 See  Daines  &  Klausner,  supra  note  121,  at  98–104;  Field & 
Karpoff, supra note 121, at 1857–58. 
132 See Coates IV, supra note 109, at 1304. 
133 Id. at 1381–82; see Klausner, supra note 113, at 1334. 
134 See Bebchuk, supra note 108, at 1825–29; see Klausner, supra note 
113, at 134–47. 
135 Salomon v. Salomon [1897] AC 22 (H.L.) 30 (U.K.).  
136 See Bebchuk, supra note 108.  
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ownership may change over time as the firm ages.137 The 
optimal governance design in the initial offering stage may 
not, and cannot, be the optimal design forever.138 Midstream 
changes by managers or controllers represent a governance 
issue that is widely recognized by scholars and institutional 
shareholders. 139  After the IPO, managers and controlling 
shareholders tend to adopt changes that entrench 
themselves at the expense of shareholders, notably in the 
poison pills and staggered boards witnessed in the United 
States.140 
In a leveraged control firm, pro-insider distortions in the 
midstream stage would be more severe as insiders are more 
entrenched and outside shareholders lack the necessary 
voting powers to counter any potentially value-decreasing 
proposals. Therefore, shareholders need an appropriate 
midstream charter amendment procedure to adjust the 
governance design to reach an optimal level that would 
benefit all shareholders.141 However, as this Article argues in 
the following section, the common adoption of supermajority 
provisions in charter amendments deters shareholders from 
making any value-increasing midstream changes and 
distorts the contracting mechanism between leveraged 
controllers and outside shareholders. Examples provided by 
Google’s and Facebook’s issuance of non-voting Class C 
 
137 Julian   Franks   et  al.,  The   Life   Cycle   of   Family   Ownership: 
International Evidence, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1675, 1675 (2012) (finding that 
family firms in a strong investor protection jurisdiction tend to evolve into 
widely-held firms, while family firms in a weak investor protection regime 
tend to preserve family control overtime). 
138 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 865 (2005); see Bebchuk, supra note 108, at 1830. 
139 See Bebchuk, supra note 108 at 1820; Klausner, supra note 113, at 
1346; Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 81, at 608–10. 
140 John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A 
Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 273–74 (2000); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 895 (2002). 
141 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1573–85 (1989) (elaborating the risks of midstream 
charter amendments).  
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shares and recent going-private transactions of U.S.-listed 
Chinese firms further illustrate how midstream decisions are 
distorted towards pro-insider decisions in a leveraged control 
firm. 
1. Supermajority Provision Deters Value-
Increasing Midstream Changes 
The fact that IPO charters are not optimal should come as 
no surprise given that the market is imperfect. In addition to 
including control-enhancing mechanisms in IPO charters, 
founders often raise the threshold to amend charters as 
well.142 By adopting a supermajority vote requirement for 
charter amendments, controlling-minority shareholders 
effectively deter shareholders from amending IPO charters 
in the midstream stage and thereby maintain leveraged 
control. Within European countries, supermajority voting 
requirements are widely adopted in different matters. 143 
Most EU member states allow companies to adopt a 
supermajority vote requirement for charter amendments.144 
In fact, supermajority provisions are often seen as a tool to 
protect minority shareholders because they prevent 
controllers from adopting amendments that favor controllers 
at the detriment of minority shareholders. However, in a 
firm with a controlling-minority structure, a supermajority 
provision for charter amendment may serve to further 
entrench the controllers at the expense of minority 
shareholders because leveraged controllers can easily block 
charter amendments with enhanced voting power. 
In a dispersed ownership firm, a supermajority provision 
is generally seen as an entrenchment provision with the 
effect of an anti-takeover provision. In the United States, 
 
142 Klausner,  Fact  and  Fiction  in  Corporate  Law  and Governance, 
supra note 113, at 1348; see Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 146 (2003). 
143 ISS ET AL., supra note 7, at 21. 
144 According to the survey of 16 EU member states in 2007, only 
Ireland restricts the application of supermajority vote on amendments to 
the articles of association. Id.  
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state corporate law generally provides that a charter 
amendment has to be initiated by the board and approved by 
a majority vote of shareholders.145 The law does not require a 
supermajority provision, as do some laws in European 
countries, yet the law does not restrict the adoption of  
supermajority provisions either.146 A recent survey of U.S. 
IPO firms from 2009–2011 reports that 74% of non-controlled 
IPO companies required a supermajority shareholder vote to 
amend their charters.147 In general, modern company law 
only sets the lower bound threshold for charter amendment, 
not  the  ceiling.148  In  extreme  cases,  the  threshold  for 
amending leveraged-control-related provisions can be as high 
as unanimous consent. For example, the Chinese Internet 
giant Alibaba publicly listed its shares on the NYSE in 
September 2014.149 Instead of adopting dual-class shares, 
Alibaba granted a partnership formed by a group of its 
founders and executives an exclusive right to nominate the 
majority of the board of directors.150 The nomination right is 
not attached to any shares but has the same function as 
priority shares where special nomination (or veto) rights are 
granted to certain shareholders. 151  To ensure that these 
leveraged control rights will not be changed through 
midstream amendments, Alibaba also inserted a 
supermajority vote requirement for future charter 
 
145 See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2006); DEL. CODE. 
ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2016); CAL. CORP. CODE § 902 (2016); N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW § 803 (2016). 
146 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.27 (2006). 
147 RICHARD      SANDLER      &      ELIZABETH      WEINSTEIN,     CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES FOR INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN THE UNITED 




148 Exceptions are found in some European countries. In Greece, 
Spain, Italy, and Poland, the law restricts supermajority from attaining 
unanimity. ISS ET AL., supra note 7, at 21. 
149 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
150 Lin & Mehaffy, supra note 44, at 455–56. 
151 Id. 
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amendments in its IPO charter. The charter provides that 
any change to the nomination rights requires the approval of 
95% of all shareholders at the shareholders’ meeting.152 
The near unanimous consent requirement for a charter 
amendment is unusual, but legal, as there is no restriction 
on the height of the voting requirement ceiling. However, 
requiring unanimity in a charter amendment creates a 
holdout problem. One or more shareholders may engage in 
holdout behavior where, in exchange for some extra private 
benefits, they may deny consent for amendments that are 
value-enhancing to all shareholders.153 Therefore, Alibaba’s 
near-unanimity requirement for charter amendment leads to 
greater entrenchment agency costs to minority shareholders. 
Similarly, Google inserted several protective provisions to 
prevent its shareholders from repealing its leveraged control 
structure through midstream amendments. Google, as a 
representative case for controlling-minority structure in the 
United States, issued two classes of shares upon its IPO. 
Class A carries one vote per share, while class B carries ten 
votes per share. Class B shares are issued to founders, 
executives, and directors, whereas class A shares are issued 
to the public.154 Two protective provisions operate to prevent 
making a midstream change to the founders’ leveraged 
control. The first provision is similar to the supermajority 
vote requirement for charter amendments. In Article 12 of 
Google’s IPO charter, any amendment to, or repeal of, the 
 
152 Alibaba   Grp.   Holding   Ltd.,   Ex.  3.2   Amended   and   Restated 
Memorandum and Articles of Association of Alibaba Group Holding 
Limited 6 (Form F-1) (June 5, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000119312514333674/d709111dex32.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2JL4-XCD9] (“Special Resolution . . . being a resolution: 
(a) passed by a majority of not less than three-fourths (or, in respect of any 
resolution relating to a Special Partnership Matter, or in any way having 
the effect of affecting a Special Partnership Matter, including, without 
limitation, any amendment to the provisions of the Memorandum or 
Articles which relate to a Special Partnership Matter, by 95% . . . )”).  
153 Bebchuk, supra note 108, at 1830–31. 
154 Google Inc., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 102–03 (Aug. 18, 
2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/ 
000119312504143377/d424b4.htm [https://perma.cc/LL5Q-JQPF]. 
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dual-class share structure will require unanimous consent 
from the board of directors, as well as the affirmative vote of 
the holders of at least a majority of the voting power.155 
Although the threshold for the shareholder vote is a 
majority, instead of a supermajority, this provision requires 
unanimous consent from all directors. Since the directors are 
also holders of multiple voting rights shares, such a provision 
effectively precludes the possibility of passing any midstream 
amendments seeking to amend or repeal the dual-class share 
structure. The second obstacle to changing Google’s 
controlling-minority structure midstream is that any change 
to the special powers, preferences, or rights of a class of stock 
in an adverse way would require that class to vote separately 
to  approve  the  proposed  amendment.156 Again,  if  the 
shareholders wish to change the right of multiple voting 
rights shares, an approval from the founders of Google is 
required. 
The fact that firms adopt a supermajority vote 
requirement for amending charters is especially problematic 
in leveraged control firms. A supermajority vote provision 
typically requires the approval of between two-thirds to 
three-quarters of the voting rights. That means that, at 
most, controllers only need to control one-third of the voting 
power to outvote an amendment proposal suggested by 
outside shareholders. With leveraged control mechanisms in 
place, controllers can easily control one-third of the total 
voting rights. Contrary to the traditional view of a 
supermajority vote as a shareholder protection mechanism, 
the supermajority provision actually operates to achieve the 
opposite effect of entrenching insiders. Therefore, the 
 
155 Google Inc., Ex. 3.01.2 Third Amended and Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation of Google Inc. 11 art. 12 (Form S-1/A) (Aug. 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504135503/de
x3012.htm [https://perma.cc/VW2G-6CQG] (“(i) the unanimous consent of 
Board of Directors then in office, and the affirmative vote of the holders at 
least a majority of the voting power of the issued and outstanding shares 
of capital stock of the Corporation then entitled to vote, shall be required 
to amend or repeal Article IV, Section 2 or this clause (i) of Article XII;”). 
156 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2016); Google Inc., supra note 
154, at 105. 
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combination of control-enhancing mechanisms and a 
supermajority vote requirement for charter amendment 
deters minority shareholders from adopting midstream 
charter amendments that would amend or repeal an 
inefficient control-enhancing mechanism or one that would 
enhance overall shareholder value. 
2. Potential Expropriation in Midstream Changes 
In a leveraged control firm, outside shareholders are 
exposed to high risks of expropriation by controlling-minority 
shareholders. Google’s issuance of non-voting Class C shares 
in 2014 is a vivid example. As mentioned, when Google went 
public in 2004, there were two classes of shares, Class B with 
ten votes per share and Class A with one vote per share.157 
Class B shares were held by Larry Page, Sergey Brin, and 
other executives. Over the years, Google has issued Class A 
shares to fund acquisitions and employee compensation. As a 
result, the control power of Class B shares was gradually 
diluted and, as asserted by Class A shareholders in a lawsuit 
challenging the issuance of the Class C stock, the founders 
became concerned that they would lose control in the 
foreseeable future. To avoid that, Page and Brin presented a 
proposal to the board to create a new, non-voting class of 
shares on January 11, 2011.158 
On April 11, 2012, Google’s special board committee and 
the board approved a recapitalization plan to create a new 
class of shares, Class C shares, and to undergo a stock split 
where each Class A or Class B share would receive a 
dividend of non-voting Class C share. 159  The purpose of 
recapitalization was to extend the control of Google’s 
founders, Page and Brin, who enjoyed over 56.1% of Google’s 
 
157 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
158 Plaintiffs’ Opening Pre-Trial Brief at 12, In re Google Inc. Class C 
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. Jun. 10, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045. 
159 Id. at 31. 
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voting  power  with  only  15%  equity  ownership.160  The 
recapitalization plan raised several shareholder protection 
concerns. Two weeks after the board’s approval, shareholders 
filed class action complaints alleging breach of directors’ 
fiduciary duties.161 When the recapitalization proposal was 
finally presented to the shareholders, 85.3% of Class A 
shareholders voted against the recapitalization proposal at 
the shareholders’ meeting. Nevertheless, the proposal still 
passed with the support of the founders’ super-voting Class B 
shares.162 This was clearly a pro-insider distorted midstream 
amendment by controlling-minority shareholders. The case 
finally settled on the eve of the Delaware Chancery Court 
trial proceedings.163 
Similarly, Facebook, which also has a dual-class share 
structure, announced a three-for-one stock split in April 2016 
whereby Facebook will issue two non-voting Class C shares 
for each outstanding Class A and Class B share held by 
shareholders.164 The main purpose for the recapitalization is 
to enable Facebook’s founder Mark Zuckerberg to sell 99% of 
his shares for philanthropy purposes yet still maintain 
control.165 With Mr. Zuckerberg holding 60% of the voting 
power, recapitalization plan to issue Class C shares passed 
 
160 Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court, In re Google Inc. 
Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 
6735045. 
161 Plaintiffs’ Opening Pre-Trial Brief at 32–37, In re Google Inc. Class 
C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045.  
162 See Google Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3–4 (June 21, 
2012). 
163 Jamie  Santo,  Google  Settles  Stock-Split  Suit  on  Eve  of  Trial, 
LAW360 (June 17, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/450580/google-
settles-stock-split-suit-on-eve-of-trial [https://perma.cc/L2H9-AYCJ].  
164 Dan Levine, Facebook Hit with Lawsuit over Plan to Issue New 
Stock, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
facebook-stocks-lawsuit-idUSKCN0XQ2LM [https://perma.cc/A8E3-99KX]. 
165 Zacks Equity Research, Facebook Shareholders Approve Creation 
of Class C Shares, NASDAQ (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/facebook-shareholders-approve-creation-of-
class-c-shares-cm638528 [https://perma.cc/VV2U-KYAE]. 
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at  the  shareholders’  meeting  on  June  20,  2016.166 
Shareholders filed class action lawsuits shortly after the 
board announced the recapitalization plan, alleging that 
directors breached their fiduciary duties by diluting voting 
rights and entrenching control by existing controllers.167 The 
recapitalization plan is a pro-insider charter amendment 
that will allow controlling-minority shareholders to sell 
billions of dollars of shares without relinquishing corporate 
control. Both Google’s and Facebook’s recent recapitalization 
plans vividly illustrate the expropriation risks faced by 
minority shareholders of pro-insider midstream charter 
amendments. 
Another example of pro-insider midstream change is the 
recent privatization of many U.S.-listed Chinese firms. An 
entrenched controlling shareholder normally extracts private 
benefits of control through three major channels: related 
party transactions, change-of-control transactions, and the 
freeze-out of minority shareholders.168 In a public corporation 
with a controlling shareholder, the market price of a share 
reflects the value of a non-controlling share.169 The price of a 
non-controlling share is usually discounted by the capitalized 
value of the expected private benefits. 170  In a freeze-out 
transaction, controlling shareholders will be able to capture 
the value of future private benefits by buying out non-
controlling shares at the then market price.171 This Article 
uses the recent privatization of U.S.-listed Chinese firms as 
an example to illustrate how controlling-minority 
shareholders can easily extract private benefits by freezing 
out minority shareholders in a leveraged control firm. 
 
166 See Facebook Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116000077/for
m8-k2016annualmeeting.htm [https://perma.cc/9D87-KWGZ]. 
167 Tom Zanki, Facebook Class C Share Plan Could Spur Followers, 
LAW360 (May 19, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/798263/facebook-
class-c-share-plan-could-spur-followers [https://perma.cc/2MF8-93PS]. 
168 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 786. 
169 Id. at 787. 
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
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In light of the higher valuation of tech stocks in the 
Chinese stock market, many U.S.-listed Chinese firms plan 
to de-list in the United States and re-list in China. 
Privatization of these firms typically involves buyout offers 
from founders, controlling shareholders, or private equity 
investors. Since 2015, 37 U.S.-listed Chinese firms have 
received buyout offers totaling $38.9 billion, which is larger 
than the total U.S. IPO proceeds of $30.3 billion in 2015.172 
The scale is widespread and has a substantial impact on U.S. 
capital markets. In a management buyout, manager 
controllers usually have substantial control over the 
privatization process, from offer timing and offer price to 
funding sources. In a firm that adopts a dual-class share 
structure, controlling shareholders typically retain more 
than half of the voting power through multiple voting shares, 
which means they are able to dominate the resolutions of a 
shareholders’ meeting.173 Outside investors are consequently 
exposed to high expropriation risks because controlling 
shareholders can engineer the whole process, such as 
choosing a time when the share price is low to minimize the 
privatization costs.174 
Here, we take Qihoo 360 Technology Co. (“Qihoo”), which 
underwent the largest privatization among U.S.-listed 
Chinese firms, as an example. Qihoo announced receipt of a 
 
172 Wei  Gu,   Scrutiny   Greets   Overseas-Listed   Chinese   Companies 
Returning Home to Relist, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-scrutinizes-deals-for-foreign-listed-
companies-to-relist-at-home-1462537821; IPO Proceeds Raised, 
RENAISSANCE CAPITAL, http://www.renaissancecapital.com/IPO-
Center/Stats/Proceeds  [https://perma.cc/J5WR-5SHH] (last visited Feb. 
14, 2017). 
173 The  founders   generally   have   control   over   the   resolutions   
of  shareholders’ meetings unless the law or the corporate charter requires 
majority of the disinterested shareholders’ approval. 
174 Controllers, who decide on whether and when to effect a freeze -out, 
are likely to have private information on the true value of the firm. 
Therefore, the pre-freezeout market price is likely to underestimate a 
firm’s true value. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Adverse 
Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts, in 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 247, 249 (Randall K. Morck ed., 
2000). 
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buyout offer from its founders and other private investors on 
June 17, 2015.175  The offer price was $77 per American 
Depositary Share, representing a 16.6% premium on the 
market price when the offer was made. The total buyout offer 
was $9.3 billion.176 On December 18, 2015, the board, acting 
upon the recommendation of an independent special 
committee, approved the proposed merger and recommended 
that shareholders vote in favor of the merger plan. Qihoo 
adopted a dual-class share structure where its founders held 
multiple voting rights shares with five votes per share and 
controlled more than 61% of the voting power.177 To complete 
the statutory merger, approval by an affirmative vote of the 
shareholders, representing at least two-thirds of the voting 
power of the shares present and voting, was required by the 
Companies Law of the Cayman Islands.178 With 61% of votes 
at hand,179 the founders easily passed the resolution at a 
shareholders’ meeting, with 69.3% of votes presenting and 
99.8% of presenting shares approving the merger.180 
There are several reasons to be concerned about 
expropriation from Qihoo’s going-private transaction. First, 
the buyout offer was made at a time when the market price 
 
175 Carlos Tejada, Qihoo Gets $9 Billion Buyout Offer From CEO, 
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/qihoo-receives-
buyout-offer-from-ceo-1434542416. 
176 Bonnie   Cao    &    Jonathan    Browning,    Qihoo’s    $9.3    Billion 




177 Press Release, Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd., Qihoo 360 Enters 




178 Companies Law § 233(6) (2013) (Cayman Is.). 
179 Press Release, Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd., supra note 177. 
180 Press Release, Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd., Qihoo 360 
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was at its lowest point since mid-2013. The average share 
price of Qihoo in May 2015, the month before the buyout 
offer, was $52.05. With the exception of February and March 
2015, this was its lowest price since July 2013.181 One way to 
compensate minority shareholders is to grant them appraisal 
rights. However, in practice, an appraisal remedy is far from 
satisfactory. Firstly, an appraisal right is not always 
available in situations involving privatization and usually 
the dissenters will not be able to perfect their rights unless 
they give the company written notice before the shareholder 
vote on the merger.182 For example, under Delaware law, 
appraisal rights are not available for shareholders of listed 
companies or companies which have more than 2000 record 
shareholders.183 Secondly, even if the appraisal rights are 
available, courts, up until today, still face difficulties in 
finding a universal valuation method to ascertain the “fair 
value” of a firm simply because there is no single perfect way 
to decide “fair value”.184 Courts in both Delaware and the 
Cayman Islands, where Qihoo is incorporated, are open to 
different methods or a combination of different methods for 
making  the  “fair  value”  determination.185  For  listed 
 
181 QIHU            Stock              Quote,             BLOOMBERG            MARKETS, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/QIHU:US [https://perma.cc/VG96-
YTHB] (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) . 
182 Delaware law provides appraisal rights only in connection with 
statutory mergers and requires shareholders to make a written demand 
for appraisal before the vote on the merger. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§§ 262(a), (b)(1), (d), and (e) (2016); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. 
COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 1147–48 (11th ed. 
2014); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 132–33 (3rd 
ed. 2012). 
183 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2016). 
184 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 182, at 99–108. 
185 The law in Cayman Island does not dictate any particular 
approach. See Cayman Court Makes First Ruling on the Meaning of “Fair 
Value” Under the Statutory Merger Regime, MOURANT OZANNES (Sept. 
2015), https://www.mourantozannes.com/media/1393540/cayman-court-
makes-first-ruling-on-the-meaning-of-fair-value-under-the-statutory-
merger-regime.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD4J-RYAB]. “The Cayman Court 
cited Canadian and Delaware jurisprudence which establishes that fair 
value should be proved by any techniques or methods which are generally 
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companies, trading prices are likely to be a benchmark for 
fair value if there is a well-informed and liquid market with 
a large public float.186 Therefore, even an appraisal right 
does not help much because insiders can choose a time when 
the price and earnings performance will give an unfairly low 
indication of the company’s true value.187 
Second, the going-private transaction had no independent 
business purpose. The only reason to go private was that the 
insiders wanted to eliminate the minority public investors 
and re-list the company in China where the market 
valuation would be much higher.188 In the United States, 
most state courts would closely scrutinize the deal if there 
were no legitimate business purpose because there is a 
higher chance of expropriation.189 In addition, the founders 
 
considered acceptable in the financial community and are otherwise 
admissible in court.” Id.; see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 
713 (Del. 1983). 
186 See Cayman Court Makes First Ruling on the Meaning of “Fair 
Value” Under the Statutory Merger Regime, supra note 185; BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 182, at 105. “Public float” refers to the percentage of shares 
available to the public. See Michael L. Hartzmark & H. Nejat Seyhun, 
Understanding the Efficiency of the Market for Preferred Stock, 8 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 149, 155–56 (2014). 
187 There   are   three   main   valuation   methods:   net   asset   value, 
capitalized earnings, and market value. Net asset valuation is a balance 
sheet-based valuation method that requires an appraisal of the current 
fair market value of the corporation’s assets on a going concern basis. 
Capitalized earnings valuation is an income statement-based valuation 
method that determines fair value by dividing the corporation’s earnings 
per share by a capitalization rate (usually the reciprocal of a comparable 
company’s price/earnings ratio). The capitalized earnings method is 
frequently used to value close corporations. The market value method 
relies on the market value of the firm’s stock. Therefore, market prices are 
considered both in capitalized earnings valuation and the market value 
method. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 182, at 99–105; ROBERT CHARLES 
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 12.2 (1986). 
188 Samuel Shen & Pete Sweeney, Chinese Companies Relisting at 
Home Attract Swarm of Quick-Hit Investors, REUTERS (June 29, 2016, 7:17 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-relisting-idUSKCN0ZF2VP 
[https://perma.cc/7UKW-HW2M]. 
189 Delaware courts abandoned the business purpose test in the 
Weinberger case, but New York and Massachusetts continue to use the 
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and the investor group expect to reap a huge reward when 
they re-list the shares in the Chinese stock market. 
Commentators expect that the market value of Qihoo in the 
Chinese market will be more than six times that of its 
buyout value, but current U.S. public investors will not be 
able to share in the gains.190  
Third, the Qihoo freeze-out transaction, like most other 
privatization deals of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, is backed by 
not only founders but also U.S. venture capital firms and 
other Chinese institutional investors.191 The investor group 
was invited and selected by the founders without the 
participation of U.S. public shareholders. These investors all 
expect to gain a huge profit from the going-private 
transaction. A recent news report reveals that some domestic 
financial institutions are promising retail investors in China 
a 500% return on products that are linked to Qihoo’s re-
listing in China.192 Such a promise suggests the potential 
profits associated with investing in Qihoo’s privatization 
deal. 
Finally, most of the legal scrutiny on the extraction of 
private benefits of control in a going-private deal lies with 
state corporate law, not federal securities law. Federal 
securities law mainly focuses on disclosure and anti-fraud, as 
in Rule 10b-5 and 13e-3, which have little effect on the 
structure of going-private deals.193 Under Delaware law, the 
entire fairness standard would apply to a freeze-out 
transaction where the majority shareholder is standing on 
 
business purpose test. See, e.g., Coggins v. New England Patriots Football 
Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1116–17 (Mass. 1986). 
190 Lulu Yilun Chen & Shai Oster, A Slice of Qihoo’s $9.3 Billion 
Buyout for Sale on China Streets, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2016, 8:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/a-slice-of-qihoo-s-9-3-
billion-buyout-for-sale-on-china-streets [https://perma.cc/28JX-Y3ZM]. 
191 Qu Yunxu & Wang Qionghui, Several Buyout Investors Backing 
Qihoo Voice Concern over Firm’s Relisting Arrangement, CAIXIN ONLINE 
(Aug. 4, 2016, 7:04 AM), http://www.caixinglobal.com/2016-08-
04/101011470.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/KX4K-
UZED]. 
192 Id. 
193 See CLARK, supra note 187, at 524. 
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both sides of the transaction.194 However, if the transaction is 
approved ex ante by a truly independent and empowered 
committee as well as by an informed majority of minority 
shareholders, the business judgment rule would apply and 
the burden of proof on the issue of fairness would shift from 
the controlling shareholder to the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff.195 Hence, approvals by an empowered independent 
committee and majority of minority shareholders serve as 
important ex ante safeguards for the interest of minority 
shareholders in a going-private transaction by controlling 
shareholders. 
In the case of Qihoo, it is not subject to the laws of 
Delaware because Qihoo is incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands.196 Since the laws of the Cayman Islands do not 
require a majority of minority shareholder vote, shareholders 
who are related to the buyer’s group are allowed to vote in 
the  shareholders’  approval  of  the  merger  proposal.197 
 
194 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
195 Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120–21 (Del. 
1994); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 82 (Del. 1995); 
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). On May 5, 
2016, the New York Court of Appeals also follow suit in its landmark 
decision In the Matter of Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., Shareholder 
Litigation. See In re Matter of Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., S’holder 
Litig., 52 N.E.3d 214 (N.Y. 2016). Note, however, that in practice, 
companies may rather subject themselves to the higher entire fairness 
standard when someone challenges the fairness of the transaction than 
recommend a majority of minority shareholder vote prior to the 
transaction because the risk of failing a majority of minority vote is high. 
See Alert Memorandum, Cleary Gottlieb, Going Private Transactions—
MFW’s Bumpy Road to Business Judgment Review (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/going-
private-transactions-mfws-bumpy-road-to-business-judgment-review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E6VW-8PG9]; Suneela Jain, Ethan Klingsberg & Neil 
Whoriskey, Examining Data Points in Minority Buy-Outs: A Practitioners’ 
Report, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 939, 953–55 (2011). 
196 Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 4 
(Mar. 29, 2011),  https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1508913/ 
000104746911002864/a2203165z424b4.htm [https://perma.cc/LQA2-D977]. 
197 Rupert Bell & Joanne Collett, Lessons Learnt from Take Private 
Transactions in Cayman Islands Merger Cases, WALKERS (Mar. 18, 2016), 
http://www.walkersglobal.com/images/Publications/News/2016/03.18.2016_
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Accordingly, Qihoo’s chairman, who initiated the going-
private proposal, voted in the shareholders’ meeting to 
approve the merger plan.198 Qihoo’s chairman, together with 
Qihoo’s president, controlled approximately 61% of the votes 
through dual-class shares and they all voted for the 
merger.199 
From the Qihoo case study, this Article demonstrates that 
there are serious conflicts of interest involved in going-
private transactions of U.S.-listed Chinese firms. Among the 
43 going-private transactions of U.S.-listed Chinese firms 
announced since 2015, only 7% of these firms are 
incorporated in Delaware.200 Among the 22 deals that were 
submitted for shareholder approval, 90% (20 out of 22) 
required no approval from a majority of minority 
shareholders.201 Even worse, 35% (15 out of 43) of these firms 
have a dual-class share structure, which means that a 
substantial portion of the insiders have disproportionate 
control and can influence, or even dominate, the shareholder 
approval for going-private mergers.202 The leveraged control 
of these firms exacerbates the expropriation concern because 
shareholder approval serves no scrutiny function to mitigate 




198 “Global Village Associates Limited, an entity controlled by Mr. 
Hongyi Zhou, and Young Vision Group Limited, an entity controlled by Mr. 
Xiangdong Qi, have agreed to vote all of the Shares they beneficially own, 
which represent approximately 61% of the voting rights attached to the 
outstanding Shares as of the date of the merger agreement, in favor of the 
authorization and approval of the merger agreement and the merger.” 
Press Release, Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd., supra note 177. 
199 Id. 
200 Lin, 2016 U.S.-Listed Chinese Firms Going-Private Transactions 
Data Base (on file with author). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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V. GOVERNING MIDSTREAM PRO-INSIDER 
DISTORTIONS 
A. Prohibiting Leveraged Corporate Control? 
The inability of minority shareholders to act in response 
to inefficient governance rules or other value-destroying 
business decisions in a leveraged control firm can partly be 
cured with proper legal intervention. For instance, 
mandatory rules that forbid the adoption of control-
enhancing mechanisms could be a sensible solution to the 
currently distorted system.203 Mandatory rules in corporate 
law can restore the imbalance of power between controllers 
and minority shareholders. A mandatory structure of 
corporate law, which bars a wide variety of suspected 
corporate behavior, would be especially justified in 
jurisdictions where enforcement is weak and investor 
protection is low.204 In such jurisdictions, the level of private 
benefits extracted by controllers is high. Therefore, an 
outright ban on certain control-enhancing mechanisms could 
be an effective way to restrict expropriations from 
controllers. 
For example, in South Korea, the economy is dominated 
by large chaebols, which are family-controlled 
conglomerates.205  Pyramids  and  cross-shareholding  are 
frequently used to enhance the control of chaebol families.206 
To improve the corporate governance of chaebols, the 
government of South Korea passed a rule that bans any new 
cross-shareholding investment among the affiliates of 
conglomerates. Under South Korea’s Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act, affiliates of large conglomerates with 
assets worth five trillion won (equal to around $4.8 billion) or 
more are banned from making new investments in one 
 
203 See Bebchuk, supra note 108, at 1851–52; Gordon, supra note 141.  
204 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1929 (1996). 
205 Terry L. Campbell II & Phyllis Y. Keys, Corporate Governance in 
South Korea: The Chaebol Experience, 8 J. CORP. FIN. 373, 374 (2002). 
206 Claessens et al., supra note 7, at 92. 
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another.207  In 2001 and 2005, Taiwan adopted a similar 
prohibition on cross-shareholding between parent companies 
and subsidiaries and also restricted the voting power of 
subsidiaries.208 
Dual-class shares are banned in almost half of the 
European countries. The 2007 EU Proportionality Report 
showed that 47% of the 16 surveyed E.U. countries prohibit 
multiple voting right shares while all of them allow 
pyramidal ownership and cross-shareholding.209 Similar to 
European countries, dual-class shares are also banned in 
most  East  Asian  jurisdictions. 210   Most  controlling 
shareholders of East Asian public companies enhance their 
control through pyramidal ownership and cross-
shareholding.211 To limit the anti-takeover effect of leveraged 
control provisions in the articles of association of European 
companies, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
proposed a “breakthrough rule” which disables such 
leveraged control mechanisms when a takeover bidder 
acquires 75% or more of the risk-bearing capital.212 Under 
the proposed rule, all control-enhancing mechanisms 
stipulated in articles of association would be dismantled, 
including voting caps, multiple voting rights, non-voting 
shares, voting rights attributed to non-risk-bearing capital, 
and special rights to appoint directors or amend articles of 
association.213 As a result of the criticism levied on the effect 
of such a rule and pressure from interested groups, the rule 
was adopted in the European Takeover Directive as 
 
207 Oh   Kyu-wook,    New    Cross-Shareholding   Ban   Takes   Effect: 
Conglomerates Pressured to Improve Governance, KOREA HERALD (July 25, 
2014), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140725000716 
[https://perma.cc/8Y6J-L2XT]. 
208 COMPANY ACT art. 167 (3) (4) & 179 II (2) (3) (2016) (Taiwan).  
209 ISS ET AL., supra note 7, at 18–22. 
210 See Claessens et al., supra note 7, at 91–92. 
211 Id. 
212 See HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, supra note 24, 
at 32; Guido Ferrarini, One Share–One Vote: A European Rule?, 3 
EUROPEAN COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. (ECFR) 147, 149–50 (2006). 
213 Ferrarini, supra note 212, at 149–50. 
LIN – FINAL  
No. 2:453] CONTROLLING-MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 503 
optional.214 Ultimately, only three member states adopted 
the breakthrough rule.215 A European Commission review in 
2012 deemed the breakthrough rule unsuccessful; however, 
it did not seek to make the rule mandatory because, in the 
Commission’s estimation, the current mixed regulatory 
approach seems to provide sufficient means to break through 
takeover defenses even without adopting the proposed 
breakthrough rule.216 
Mandatory rules have been adopted by regulators in 
different jurisdictions to restrict certain types of control-
enhancing mechanisms. Yet, there does not seem to be a 
consistent rationale in the choice of prohibitive mechanisms. 
Most European and East Asian jurisdictions prohibit 
multiple voting rights shares through the one-share one-vote 
rule. However, these jurisdictions also allow pyramidal 
ownership and cross-shareholding, which create deviations 
between control rights and voting rights similar to multiple 
voting rights shares. It would be a challenge for regulators to 
prohibit pyramidal ownership because business groups, 
which are structured on pyramidal ownership, create 
synergies in business operation and therefore should 
generally be allowed. In addition, it may not be easy for 
regulators to define the scope of pyramids and to properly 
limit their use.217 
Every company has its own distinct characteristics, and 
shareholders are the best party to decide on internal 
corporate affairs. The rationale of “one size fits all” does not 
work in corporate governance regulation. Control-enhancing 
 
214 Council Directive 04/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC) (on takeover 
bids). Several Nordic countries, including Sweden, Finland and Denmark, 
opposed the extension of “breakthrough” rule. For a detailed description on 
criticisms and oppositions from member states, see Skog, supra note 123, 
at 296–99. 
215 The three countries are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. See Report 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, at 3–4, 
COM (2012) 346 final (June 28, 2012).  
216 Id. at 10. 
217 Ferrarini, supra note 212, at 150–51. 
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mechanisms could be beneficial under certain situations 
and/or for certain companies. Family-controlled firms, firms 
in the media industry, and, recently, firms in the high-tech 
industry are the types of firms that tend to choose a 
leveraged control structure.218 Oftentimes, founding families 
and entrepreneurs are unwilling to relinquish control in 
exchange for external financing. However, if control-
enhancing mechanisms are not allowed, many start-up 
companies or family businesses may lose the chance to grow, 
which could hamper national economic development. Thus, 
this Article argues against the outright prohibition of any 
specific type of control-enhancing device and advocates 
returning decision-making rights to shareholders to decide 
whether specific governance structures are good for the 
company. 
B. Empowering Minority Shareholders 
This Article argues that empowering shareholders would 
best mitigate the risks of midstream opportunistic change by 
controllers with leveraged control and would allow 
shareholders to adopt value-increasing midstream charter 
amendments. As this Article has previously illustrated, there 
is an extreme imbalance of power between leveraged 
controllers and outside shareholders. The extreme protective 
schemes created during the IPO stage are unlikely to be 
renegotiated by outside shareholders afterwards due to the 
nature of control-enhancing mechanisms and the commonly 
included supermajority vote requirement for charter 
amendments. Even without the supermajority provision, 
controllers are likely to control over half of voting powers 
through control-enhancing mechanisms. Thus, outside 
shareholders of leveraged control firms are generally unable 
to exercise their renegotiation right and thus are exposed to 
higher agency costs arising from insiders’ moral hazard 
problem.219 The best way to restore the balance of power in a 
 
218 Gompers et al., supra note 8, at 1084; Goshen & Hamdani, supra 
note 81, at 591. 
219 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 81, at 588–91. 
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leveraged control firm is to empower outside shareholders. 
Specifically, this Article proposes empowering outside 
shareholders by increasing shareholder participation 
through shareholder activism. 
1. Increasing Shareholder Participation 
Similar to control-enhancing mechanisms, anti-takeover 
measures are commonly viewed as protective schemes that 
entrench  incumbents  and  reduce  shareholder  value.220 
However, shareholder participation in the adoption of anti-
takeover measures may bring positive value to shareholders. 
This is because their approval may represent shareholder 
commitment not to dismiss directors prematurely and thus 
allow directors to pursue projects that are beneficial to 
shareholders in the long run.221 Recent empirical studies also 
confirm the validity of this hypothesis and find that anti-
takeover measures that require shareholder approval, such 
as staggered boards and charter amendment restrictions, are 
associated with higher firm value than those adopted 
unilaterally by the board, such as poison pills and golden 
parachutes.222 
People may doubt the effectiveness of shareholder voting 
in a controlled firm, particularly in a leveraged control firm, 
because the higher the percentage of votes controlled by 
insiders, the lesser the chance that outside shareholders will 
be able to challenge the exertion of such control. However, 
recent empirical studies report otherwise. They show that 
shareholder voting can be an effective means to exercise 
governance, not only in U.S. firms but also in non-U.S. 
 
220 Gompers et al., supra note 8; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & 
Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS. 
783, 784 (2009). 
221 Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity 
in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 63–64 (1982). 
222 K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Commitment and Entrenchment in 
Corporate Governance, 110 NW U.L. REV. 727, 730 (2016); Cremers & Sepe, 
supra note 80, at 67. 
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firms223 and firms with substantial insider control.224 Peter 
Iliev et al. investigated the effectiveness of shareholder 
voting by U.S. institutional investors on director election and 
merger approval in 8160 firms across 43 countries. The 
sample firms had an average insider control of 38.2%; yet, 
they found evidence showing that there were active 
shareholder voting actions and that such voting actions 
resulted in governance-related outcomes. 225  In particular, 
greater dissent voting by outside shareholders is associated 
with higher subsequent director turnover and more 
withdrawals from merger and acquisition deals.226 Therefore, 
shareholder participation through voting may serve as an 
effective monitoring device, even in a controlled firm. 
Furthermore, institutional ownership has grown 
dramatically in recent years. In the United States, the 
institutional holdings of public equities have grown from 
6.1% in the 1950s to 28.4% in 1980 and reached 50.6% in 
2009.227 Other countries are also experiencing steady growth 
in institutional ownership in public equities.228 According to 
a survey of public companies in 23 countries, the average 
total institutional ownership in non-U.S. jurisdictions was 
around 27% in 2007, with an average growth of 2.4% each 
year from 2003.229 It is expected that institutional investors, 
including pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance 
 
223 Recent studies on U.K. corporate acquisition voting also support 
the positive impact of shareholder voting on firm value. See Marco Becht et 
al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?, 29 
REV. FIN. STUD. 3035, 3035–36. 
224 Reena Aggarwal et al., Does Governance Travel Around the World? 
Evidence from Institutional Investors, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 154, 154, 167 
(2011); Peter Iliev et al., Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance 
Around the World, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2167, 2168 (2015). 
225 Iliev et al., supra note 224 at 2168, 2170–71, 2180.  
226 Id. at 2188–96. 
227 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 874–75 (2013). 
228 OECD, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 20–21 (2011). 
229 Aggarwal et al., supra note 224, at 159. 
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companies, will play an important role in constraining the 
opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders.230 
2. The Role of Institutional Shareholders and 
Shareholder Activism 
The growth of institutional ownership does not, in and of 
itself, improve the corporate governance of controlled firms. 
Institutional investors are usually passive investors who 
tend to be silent on voting. The voting power of institutional 
investors only becomes influential when they are persuaded 
by activist shareholders or proxy advisory services firms.231 
That is, shareholder activists propose governance proposals 
while institutional investors evaluate proposals and decide 
their  voting  strategies.232  Such  cooperation  has  gained 
prominence and drastically changed the landscape of 
corporate governance in recent years.233 With the assistance 
of shareholder activists, institutional investors are playing 
an active role in policing corporations and asking for change 
through shareholder proposals to declassify boards and 
advocate  for  other  governance-related  changes.234  The 
common view is that staggered boards decrease shareholder 
value.235 The Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law 
 
230 OECD, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 20–21 (2011); Gilson, supra note 5, at 108–12. 
231 Gilson and Gordon described the attitude as “rationally reticent”—
a willingness to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them. 
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 227, at 895. 
232 Id. at 896–97. 
233 See Bebchuk, supra note 138, 18–22.  
234 ISS,  ISS  2016  Board  Practices  Study,   HARV.  L.  SCH.  F.   CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2016/06/01/iss-2016-board-practices-study/ [https://perma.cc/MG8C-NJ2X]. 
235 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 220, at 784–85 (finding six 
measures, including staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for mergers and charter amendments, are correlated with 
negative firm value). Later, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang further focused on 
the effect of staggered boards and found that staggered boards were 
associated with statistically significant reduction in firm value. See Alma 
Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder 
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School has worked with institutional investors since 2012 to 
bring shareholder proposals for de-staggering boards to S&P 
500 and Fortune 500 companies. From 2012 to 2015, 102 
S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies declassified their 
boards as a result of shareholder actions.236 The shareholder 
empowerment movement began to change the dynamics of 
corporate powers in the 1980s when many large companies 
adopted protective measures in response to an active 
takeover market.237 The percentage of S&P 500 companies 
that have classified boards drastically decreased from 45% in 
2004 to 7% in 2014.238 U.S. hedge fund activists are not only 
active in policing firms with dispersed corporate ownership, 
but also go after controlled firms. With proper legal tools, 
such as the right to nominate and elect minority directors, 
activists are able to exert effective influence even in a dual-
class firm with the presence of a controlling-minority 
shareholder. 239  A survey of interventions by hedge fund 
activists in Europe reports a positive increase in the 
 
Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 627 
(2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched 
Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 409 (2005); see also Cremers & Sepe, supra 
note 80, at 67 (finding staggered boards are positively correlated with firm 
value); Cremers et al., supra note 222 at 727 (finding shareholder 
approved anti-takeover measures, including staggered boards, are 
positively correlated with firm value). 
236  Declassifications,           SHAREHOLDER             RIGHTS             PROJECT, 
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml  [https://perma.cc/ 
8QZ3-39NQ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
237 Harwell Wells, Shareholder Power in America, 1800-2000: A Short 
History, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 13, 24 (2015). 




239 Other legal tools include majority of minority shareholder approval 
in a going-private transaction and shareholder litigation. See Kobi Kastiel, 
Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 90–103 (2016). Empirical research shows that 
minority shareholders receive lower merger consideration when controllers 
do not have to seek the approval of majority of minority shareholders or of 
an independent board committee. See Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix 
Freeze-Outs: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 14–18 (2007). 
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shareholder value of target firms and further supports the 
notion that shareholder participation creates value for the 
firm.240 
This Article thus argues that proxy advisory firms and 
shareholder activists should also include leveraged control 
devices in their agenda. In recent years, ISS and Glass 
Lewis, the two most prominent proxy advisory services firms, 
have  made  great  progress241  by  focusing  heavily  on 
declassifying boards, majority voting rules for director 
election, and proxy access.242 The risk of insiders making 
opportunistic decisions at the midstream stage in leveraged 
control firms has not been fully recognized by shareholder 
activists. Recently, ISS identified inefficient IPO governance 
arrangements as detrimental to shareholders. In November 
2015, ISS announced a new voting policy on unilateral bylaw 
or charter amendments. ISS recommends either withholding 
or voting against directors of companies who, prior to or in 
connection with, their IPO, adopt bylaw or charter provisions 
that are detrimental to shareholders until the amendments 
are reversed or ratified by shareholders.243 ISS regards pre-
IPO bylaw or charter provisions as unilateral actions because 
post-IPO investors do not have a chance to participate in the 
decision-making process when the provisions are adopted 
during the IPO stage. Most of the time, pre-IPO shareholders 
also implement a supermajority vote provision to make it 
harder to change charters afterwards and in order to ensure 
 
240 Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe 20–22 (ECGI-
Finance Working Paper No. 283/2010, 2010). 
241 S&P 500 companies that adopt majority voting grow from nearly 
60% in 2009 to nearly 90% in 2015. See ISS, supra note 234. 
242 See ISS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PROXY VOTING GUIDELINE UPDATES 
AND PROCESS (2015), https://www.issgovernance.com/ file/policy/executive-
summary-of-key-2016-updates-and-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZB5-
374W]; GLASS LEWIS, PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES 2016 PROXY SEASON: 
UNITED STATES (2016), http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/2016_Guidelines_United_States.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WP73-B476]. 
243 ISS      Releases     2016     Benchmark     Policy     Updates,     ISS, 
https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-releases-2016-benchmark-policy-
updates-2/ [https://perma.cc/9PCR-VY96] (last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
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that the entrenchment provisions they surreptitiously 
implemented at the IPO stage remain in place after the 
company goes public.244 To prevent midstream opportunistic 
behaviors from occurring, ISS proposes that IPO governance 
measures that are detrimental to shareholders should be 
ratified by post-IPO shareholders in order to make insiders 
accountable to shareholders.245 Even though ISS’s actions 
mainly focus on the pre-IPO adoption of classified boards and 
supermajority vote requirements for charter amendments, 
this Article argues that a dual-class share structure and 
other leveraged control arrangements should also be subject 
to post-IPO ratification by shareholders. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate control structure differs according to firms. 
What works in one firm may not work in another. The 
tradeoff between monitoring benefits and entrenchment 
agency costs is always difficult to weigh in a controlled firm; 
the key is to constrain the extraction of private benefits of 
control by controlling shareholders. Regulators can create a 
sound legal system that reduces the level of private benefits 
extractions by leveraged controllers, but they are not in a 
suitable position to make choices for shareholders. This 
Article therefore argues against the outright prohibition of 
any specific types of control-enhancing mechanisms. Instead, 
the shareholders of each firm should choose an optimal 
governance regime. Inefficiencies in governance would be 
best addressed by each firm’s shareholders through voting. 
Therefore, this Article advocates increasing shareholder 
participation in leveraged control firms and suggests proxy 
advisory firms and shareholder activists include leveraged 
control devices in their agenda so as to govern the midstream 
opportunistic behaviors of leveraged controllers.  
 
244 “A significant percentage of recent IPOs in the U.S. have included 
provisions that limit board accountability to post-IPO investors and make 
it difficult for shareholders to amend the company’s governing documents 
or take other corporate actions.” Id. 
245 Id. 
